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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council o f  the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas o f  
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
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Programme in Economie Policy
The Working Papers series
The Schuman Centre’s Programme in Economic Policy provides a framework 
for the presentation and development of ideas and research that can constitute 
the basis for informed policy-making in any area to which economic reasoning 
can make a contribution. No particular areas have been prioritized against others, 
nor is there any preference for "near-policy" treatments. Accordingly, the scope 
and style of papers in the series is varied.
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Using a sample of around one million observations, formed by combining two 
micro datasets from the 1991 Census o f Population, the paper explores male and 
female unemployment differences across Britain’s ethnic minorities. The large 
sample size allows a detailed multivariate analysis of females for the first time. 
Unemployment differences are not simply the result of characteristic differences 
or discrimination by the white majority.
High rates of unemployment for migrant workers are typical of the EU, so the 
methods of the paper should be of general interest. Of particular interest is the 
comparison between UK bom and foreign bom ethnic minorities. Unemployment 
rates among the former tend to be considerably higher, but this is accounted for 
by characteristic differences. Thus there is no evidence that the UK bom are 
doing worse, as the raw data suggests, but they do not seem to becoming better 
assimilated either.
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Although the detailed empirical investigation of this paper is focused on 
Britain, the problem of ethnic minority unemployment is very much a European 
issue. Furthermore, 1997 has been declared by the EU to be the European year 
against racism, so to concentrate on the racial dimension of unemployment 
seems appropriate. The theme is one worrying consequence of Eurosclerosis — 
the generally high levels of unemployment that have existed following the oil 
crises of the 1970s. With double digit unemployment rates a feature in several 
countries, marginal groups, in particular immigrants and ethnic minorities, tend 
to suffer disproportionately. Table (1) gives some information about this. It can 
be seen that those on the margins suffer much higher rates of unemployment 
than the native bom majority. Of particular note are some astonishingly high 
rates of unemployment among the younger age categories. Notice that the 
unemployment differential between minority groups and the majority are lowest 
in the United States and these smaller differences are also typical for Black 
Americans (Stratton, 1993).1
Table (2) gives the British picture over a number of years and neatly illustrates 
the disproportionate effect Eurosclerosis has had on ethnic minority 
unemployment rates. In 1979, the male unemployment differential was less than 
2 percent, yet by 1994 the differential had risen to over 14 percent. Female 
unemployment rates also show the same disproportionate differential increase. 
Table (3) gives some information about earnings disadvantage. The ethnic wage 
gap is around 10 percent for males, but there is little ethnic difference for 
females. Notice that UK bom non-white males seem to do even worse, but, in 
actual fact, characteristics (such as a younger age profile) account for the 
majority of this. When compared with similar whites much of the ethnic wage 
gap seems to disappear.2 For this reason, we regard unemployment, not earnings 
disadvantage, as the most serious issue. The theoretical literature on
1 Cynics might argue that part of the reason is that huge numbers of Blacks are now in 
gaol. See Bound and Freeman (1992).
2 The issue of earnings discrimination is extensively investigated in Blackaby et al. 
(1997), and Leslie et al. (1996). Dex (1992) surveys some evidence for some European 
countries, showing that migrants tend to be crowded into the worst jobs, with limited 





























































































discrimination, which more often than not operates through competition models, 
has tended to give little emphasis to the unemployment issue.3
What has been the European response to Eurosclerosis? Basically, what has been 
observed has been a convergence in national immigration policies, with ‘Keep 
Out’ signs now posted throughout Europe. The early post-war years of labour 
shortage were the heyday of the open door approach. This was followed by 
restrictions on legal immigration (but in reality, legislation did not stop the 
inflow of large numbers of immigrants). With restrictions on legitimate 
immigration becoming increasingly severe, potential migrants have sought other 
means to enter, such as claiming refugee or asylum status. Pressure of numbers 
through the asylum route has led to a progressive tightening of this means of 
entry. It seems inevitable that illegal immigration will become a major issue in 
future years, as this becomes the only way for the many who seek a more 
affluent lifestyle. Fortress Europe is likely to be a very leaky sieve, and a larger 
proportion of illegal immigrants is likely to exacerbate the already marginalised 
status of immigrant groups.
Table (2) suggests that a reversal of Eurosclerosis could do much to eliminate 
the large differences in unemployment rates because non-whites appear to do 
relatively well in periods of upturn. Economic policy of the EU seems to stress 
a low inflation goal, rather than achieving the low unemployment rates of the 
early post-war years. Monetary union with an independent Central Bank may be 
an effective anti-inflation weapon, but would not strike the average unemployed 
non-white youth in Central Manchester as being of much relevance to their own 
predicament. Once the major issues of monetary union and a common 
immigration policy (with the usual British opt out on both) have been settled, 
the presence of a large number of marginalised groups and few legal rights for 
illegal workers will become a dominant EU issue.
2 The economic benefits of immigration
One question that is sometimes posed is whether immigration offers any benefits 
to the indigenous population. If so, then the monetary value of the immigration 
surplus can offset the cost of social tensions and the fiscal cost of the larger use 
that immigrants might make of welfare services. Depending on the assumptions
3 Becker (1971) in the second edition of his famous monograph, has stepped back from 
his earlier speculation that characteristic differences, such as being concentrated in occupations 




























































































made, models can come up with a variety of predictions about the impact of 
immigration (Borjas, 1995, Friedberg and Hunt, 1995).
Whatever the preferred model, any possible negative impact is bound to be small 
on the indigenous population. Imagine the worst possible negative case where 
immigrants are non-productive and they are given welfare benefits equal to the 
average wage of the indigenous population. Given the small numbers of 
immigrants typically found in European countries, the maximum average 
negative impact is small, despite the fact that racists would claim otherwise. It 
teaches us to think of immigration and the presence of ethnic minorities as an 
issue, not a problem.
But it is not true that immigrants simply join the unemployed, in which case 
benefits to the indigenous population are also possible. This is just a variation 
of the theme that free trade is a good thing for all. However, as before, given 
the small numbers involved, possible benefits to the indigenous population 
should not be exaggerated. Borjas (1993), reviewing some US studies, confirms 
this point. Stripped to its essence, the mutual benefit idea is based on some 
elementary properties of concave functions. Suppose that average income for the 
indigenous population in the receiving country is given by the concave function
y = w(k) + r(k)k, ^
where y  is average income, k is capital per head (this could be thought of as 
human capital as well as physical capital). Income for any particular individual 
with capital endowment k, is given by the linear function
yt = w(k) + rik)kt . (2)
Equation (1) embodies the idea that the return to capital r(k) declines_as the 
economy becomes capital rich and the return to unskilled labour w(k) will 
increase. The concavity of eq.(l) is a natural property for an economy with 
marginal product pricing and a well-behaved concave production function. 
Given concavity, immigration is beneficial as long as immigrants have an 
average capital endowment different from k. Immigration will alter the average 
capital endowment and hence w and r. The change in average incomes of the 




























































































Ay = Aw +Ark > 0. (3)
Because of the concavity of eq.(l), this is always positive. However in view of 
the smallness of any potential overall benefit, commentators have tended to 
focus on the impact of immigration on the distribution of income. Immigration 
of unskilled labour, since it raises r and lowers w, will be of most benefit to 
skilled labour. By contrast, immigration of skilled labour, since it raises w and 
lowers r, is of most benefit to unskilled labour. The critical capital endowment 
for a particular individual is where there is no net benefit to that individual. The 
critical value kc is where
Ayc = 0 = Aw + k rk c (4)
Those with an endowment below kc would lose out if immigration of unskilled 
labour drove changes in relative prices and those above kc would lose out if 
immigration consisted of skilled labour. Immigration policy is now weighted in 
favour of skilled labour, which ought, if anything, to reduce income inequality.
Once again, the magnitudes involved are likely to be small. Imagine the case 
where the immigrant population is 5 percent, all with a zero capital endowment. 
Suppose that eq.(l) is derived from the Cobb-Douglas function y  = K*. The 
largest wage reduction will occur for those with no capital endowment, which 
is easily seen to be 1 - 1.05a. A reasonable guess for a  would be around .2 and 
would give a maximum reduction in the wage of less than 1 percent. The overall 
gain to the indigenous population is less than .02 percent.
So the idea that immigration poses a major threat to the low paid is greatly 
exaggerated. In fact, it is the globalisation of world trade which probably poses 
the larger threat. Wood (1994) has emphasised this aspect and argues that it is 
in part responsible for Eurosclerosis. The immigration model is just an 
application of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theorem, where the import is now 
labour rather than goods embodying labour. As previously mentioned, one 
criticism that can be made of these models is that they concentrate on the impact 
on earnings and overlook the difficulty that minorities sometimes have in finding 
employment. The full employment competitive paradigm may not be the best 
way to handle the issue.
Immigration may bring intangible benefits that the somewhat terse formal 
models ignore. Ethnic communities provide a whole new set of commodity 




























































































restaurants is one good example. Boijas (1995), in the spirit of the new 
international trade theory, speaks of,
"Immigration expands the size of the market. It can introduce many new 
interactions among workers and firms, so that both workers and firms ‘pick up’ 
knowledge without paying for it. As a result, even though the production 
technology at the firm level has constant returns to scale, the external effects 
resulting from immigration might lead to increasing returns on the aggregate."
Once again these ‘free lunch’ magnitudes are difficult to quantify, but they are 
no doubt there. One cannot help feeling that the benefits of immigration to 
economies such as the United States, Canada and Australia have been larger than 
those suggested by formal models that ignore externalities.
Zimmermann (1995) tackles the issue in a less formal way. Population growth 
among the receiving countries tends to be very low, and all these countries will 
face the problem of an ageing population. The traditional emigrant countries 
have, by contrast, high population growth and a very youthful population. 
Immigration can redress the problem of age imbalance and contribute towards 
a dynamic workforce with a sufficient fiscal base to support a large number of 
elderly and unproductive citizens. In 1995, migration accounted for 75 percent 
of the EU population growth and this does not take into account the greater 
fertility among immigrant and ethnic minority populations which stem the 
tendency towards an ageing population.4
3 Britain’s ethnic minorities
Non-white immigration into Britain has a long tradition, much of it associated 
with its maritime history. It is estimated that there were around 20,000 black 
domestic servants in London in the mid 1700s and the dock areas of Britain, 
such as Cardiff and Liverpool have had significant black populations since the 
early nineteenth century. The second world war also saw the arrival of large 
numbers of black servicemen from the Colonies.5
Nevertheless, apart from the special case of the Irish, the majority of Britain’s 
ethnic minority population is of recent origin. The start of the modem influx is 
associated with the arrival of the Empire Windrush in 1948, which brought
4 Eurostat (1996b).



























































































around 500 Black-Caribbeans and generated considerable publicity at the time. 
In 1948, there were few restrictions on immigration from the Colonies and the 
Commonwealth, and labour shortages meant a steady inflow. Industries such as 
transport and textiles actively recruited from abroad. Initially, the numbers 
arriving were very small, mainly Black-Caribbean. There were also arrivals from 
the Indian subcontinent, for example around 1000 Indian doctors arrived in the 
late 1940s.
It is actually difficult to obtain an accurate figure on numbers because the Home 
Office would collect information on only those subject to immigration control 
— and legislation to limit numbers occurred much later. Even then, many were 
excluded from a formal count. Little or no information is available on those who 
chose to return home after a period of time working in Britain. It should also be 
remembered that there was considerable white immigration — indeed many of 
those classified as coming from New Commonwealth countries were in fact 
white expatriates.6
Immigration from the Caribbean peaked in the 1960s, whereas the bulk of 
arrivals from India and Pakistan occurred at a later date. East African Asians, 
who held British passports and were not then subject to restrictions, arrived in 
significant numbers in the late 1960s. The expulsion around 1972-73 of the 
Ugandan Asian population meant another large inflow of Asians. The 1980s saw 
the arrival of large numbers of Hong Kong Chinese and Bangladeshis. With the 
current severe restrictions on further immigration, ethnic population growth 
initially came from the admission of dependants of those with a right of 
domicile and latterly from children bom in Britain. A feature of post-war 
immigration has been a movement away from the traditional areas of London 
and the ports, to the extent that most cities now have significant ethnic minority 
populations.
Immigration into Britain has tended to be very localised. For example, one 
individual from a particular village in India would be the pathfinder. His 
experience would then encourage others to follow from his place of origin and 
the new arrivals would choose to live close by, often on the same street. 
Populations inevitably become very clustered and close-knit. Although one of 
the lessons of this study is the diversity of experience, it should be remembered 
that there is considerable difference and separate traditions within particular





























































































groups. For example, Indian Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Gujeratis are fairly 
diverse, yet we do not have sufficient data to consider them singly.
Table (4), derived from the Labour Force Survey, gives some information about 
year of arrival. It confirms the brief historical account just given. Notice the 
high numbers of British bom among the Black-Other category, reflecting the 
ambiguity of ethnic origin among the second and subsequent generations. The 
late arrival of the Pakistani/Bangladeshi group is also noteworthy. This is the 
most disadvantaged group, particularly the small numbers of Bangladeshis, who 
have had the least amount of time to assimilate. They also arrived at a time of 
least economic opportunity, when jobs were relatively scarce.
4 What is meant by ethnicity in the British data?
This is a controversial question and one on which there are no clear-cut answers. 
The advantage of focusing on ethnicity, rather than immigrant status or 
nationality, is that the labour market performance of British bom descendants 
can be explored. Secondly, foreign nationals will consist of both whites and non­
whites, who are likely to be discriminated against, if at all, in different way A 
question about an individual’s ethnic background will be able to delineate these 
categories.
In survey data, there are two ways to elicit information about a respondent’s 
ethnic background. The first method is where colour is decided upon by the 
opinion of the interviewer, without consultation with the person being 
interviewed. This was the method adopted in the General Household Survey up 
to 1993/94. The interviewer is asked to ‘code from observation’ if the household 
member is coloured, white or if unable to form an opinion. The category of non­
white is derived from answers to this question. Given that discrimination is 
based on the perception of the majority — mistaken or otherwise — there is 
perhaps some slight advantage in this approach.
The second method is to ask the respondent a specific question and this has been 
the approach of the 1991 Census, which is the main data source of this paper. 
It was only after considerable debate that a question on ethnic background was 
asked for the first time in the decennial Census. Unlike information on country 
of birth, which is also asked in the Census, ethnicity is very much a question of 
personal preference and it is not surprising that a certain amount of ambiguity 
is likely to be the order of the day. It is also a somewhat politically charged 
topic because to be invited to specify an ethnic background from a foreign land 




























































































that this question was designed to enumerate information about the numbers of 
non-white British citizens and that such information might be used in negative 
way against those who answered the question. This was particularly true for the 
Affo-Caribbean community, among the oldest of the ethnic groups, with nearly 
60 percent (of all ages) bom in the United Kingdom as of the Census date.
The Census itself offered no guidance as to how an individual might respond to 
the ethnicity question, apart from the advice that, "If the person is descended 
from more than one ethnic or racial group, please tick the group to which the 
person considers he/she belongs, or tick the ‘Any other ethnic group’ box and 
describe the person’s ancestry in the space provided". Ballard and Kalra (1994) 
have commented on the Census ethnicity question that, "Ethnicity is best 
regarded as being primarily a matter of community affiliation, and as such it has 
no necessary connection either with one’s birthplace or one’s genetic heritage."7 *
There is no doubt some truth in this, but one suspects that most would have read 
the advice section in the Census form and some may have concluded otherwise. 
All things considered, ethnicity is thorny and difficult issue, on which definite 
answers are just about impossible.
Given that the first option offered was ‘White’, there can be little doubt that this 
question was primarily concerned with skin colour. In addition to the ‘White’ 
category, eight other categories were offered; ‘Black-Caribbean’, ‘Black- 
Affican’, ‘Black-Other’ were the next three possible choices. Respondents were 
asked to give further details for this latter question. This gave a natural split in 
the Census form, strongly suggesting that Black-Other refers to those of African 
descent. In fact, the Black-Other category consists of mainly British bom but 
does contain a very small number of Asian bom. The next group is ‘Indian’ 
followed by ‘Pakistani’, then ‘Bangladeshi’. Interestingly, even though 
Bangladesh only became a legal entity in 1971 and Pakistan in 1947, 
respondents had no difficulty in using these as ethnic identifiers. The final 
categories were ‘Chinese’ and a final catch-all group for which further details 
were asked, ‘Any other ethnic group’.
Despite the pitfalls, it appears in practice that most had little difficulty in 
responding to the ethnic group question — even though ostensively similar 
people might respond in a different way. Part of this arises from the fact that the
7 Solomos (1993) and Rex (1991) provide extensive discussions of this issue. Hostility to 
ethnic groups sometimes arises because they are seen as a threat to the state, in the sense that 
ethnic identity might dominate any sense of national identity. A famous example, which 
aroused considerable hostility, was Lord Tebbit’s cricket test, whereby he questioned the




























































































majority of non-white adult respondents would be bom abroad and the ethnicity 
and country of birth questions more or less coalesce. These adults, with some 
notable exceptions, were also happy to give their children the same ethnic 
identifier. Many Afro-Caribbeans, however, identified their children as Black- 
Other.8The fact that many British bom are able to identify themselves with 
specific ethnic categories does speak volumes about the state of assimilation in 
British society. Appendix (1) gives some more detailed information about the 
ethnic categories and how they are built up from the individual Census 
responses.
Ambiguity is more likely to be a problem in any future Census, because British 
bom non-whites need not feel any cultural affiliation with any pre-specified 
ethnic group despite their ancestry. The Irish are a good example of this natural 
type of assimilation. The Census identified a large number of Irish bom 
immigrants, but did not attempt to identify British bom Irish as a separate ethnic 
group. Second generation Irish — with possibly one British parent — would more 
than likely identify themselves as British, with little more than lip service paid 
to their Irish roots. However, it is likely that the 2001 Census will include Irish 
as a separate ethnic category. In the subsequent analysis, we will include the 
Irish bom as an additional ethnic category. It provides a useful comparison white 
group, which possibly has problems of assimilation, against which to compare 
non-white ethnic groups.
The controversial nature of the ethnic background question has been recently 
highlighted by the proposed ethnicity question for the 2001 Census, which is 
now being piloted. With the progress of time, the majority of non-whites will 
be British bom and with one in three black men now living with or married to 
a white women, the question of classifying ethnic identity becomes ever more 
difficult and sensitive.9 Two new categories of ‘Black-British’ and ‘Mixed- 
Race’ have been proposed and have met with hostility from politicians and from 
the Commission o f  Racial Equality. Such criticism does seem misplaced, given 
the recognition that British non-whites face discrimination. If they can not be 
identified, their economic circumstances can not be properly investigated.
8 Ballard and Kalra (1994), Table (2) provide an interesting cross-tabulation of ethnic 
group and country of birth.




























































































5 British immigration legislation
The watchword here is fear, whether real or imaginary. Wartime was the classic 
time for xenophobic outbursts against people not considered to be British. For 
example, between 1914 and 1919 over 28,000 aliens were deported and in the 
second world war around 22,000 people of German origin and 4,300 Italians 
were interned. In recent times, fear of potential fifth columnists has been 
replaced by a fear of numbers. Writers on this subject often hark back to some 
far off halcyon day of liberalism when individuals could travel freely and reside 
more or less where the liked. It is, however, very easy to have a liberal policy 
as long as the numbers taking advantage of opportunities are small. Britain is not 
unique, because most of the traditional receiving countries (apart from Norway) 
have modified their rules on immigration in response to increased numbers 
seeking admission.10 Immigration policies in receiving countries have tended 
to converge. The joke is sometimes made that the difference between 
democracies and totalitarian regimes is the latter will not let people out and the 
former will not let people in.
Nowadays travel is inexpensive and within the means of even the poorest. The 
growth of television and communications mean that most have a knowledge and 
a perspective of a world beyond their small homeland. More and more seek the 
economic opportunities that life in more affluent Western countries promise. 
Furthermore, language is less of a barrier to travel. With large migrant 
populations already present, the need to assimilate is lessened. For example, 
Lazear (1995) has drawn attention to the fact that many migrants to the USA no 
longer need to leam English. There is a whole ethnic infrastructure of schools, 
newspapers, radio, television, and so forth to cater for needs. It is not just a local 
issue as more countries in the West have become recipients of immigrant 
populations. Most now have significant ethnic minority populations which have 
arrived after 1945. As in Britain, many of these groups have not integrated.
In short, it has never been easier for potential migrants to travel and seek a new 
life. Castles and Miller (1993) estimate that around 1.7 percent of the world’s 
population live in a country other than their own, including 20 million refugee 
and asylum seekers. This excludes the descendants of these immigrants who 
might be full citizens of the host country but would identify themselves as 
members of their parent’s ethnic group. They also estimate that around one 
quarter of the world’s migrants are illegal, although to our knowledge no-one 
has attempted to calculate the size of Britain’s illegal ethnic minority population.



























































































This is a group that would choose to remain very inconspicuous for obvious 
reasons. It is a reasonable guess, however, that illegal immigrants would be even 
more economically disadvantaged compared with recognized ethnic minorities. 
The International Labour Organisation has estimated that there are 2.6 million 
illegal immigrants in Europe as a whole, but admit this figure is only a rough 
guess. As the mechanisms for legitimate immigration become more and more 
restricted, illegal migrant populations will become the most pressing issue. They 
are likely to be even more marginalised and vulnerable to exploitation. It will 
not be practical or possible forcefully to remove millions of people.
International migration has accelerated from the 1980s. People on the move is 
one of the major issues of the 1990s. It is perhaps inevitable that most of the 
richer industrialised countries have adopted increasingly severe restrictions 
against economic migrants and have also sought to limit the numbers of asylum 
seekers, that is those claiming to flee political repression. In fact, it is asylum 
seekers who are now the main source of the growth of immigrant populations 
as other means are precluded. In Western Europe there were just 64,000 arrivals 
in 1983 seeking asylum, which grew to 417,000 in 1990. Bohning (1991) has 
estimated that of the 1.6 million asylum seekers who arrived between 1983- 
1990, only 320,000 returned home. Many unsuccessful applicants stay on either 
legally or illegally, or else try their luck in another country. As the rules tighten 
— and in Germany the success rate for asylum seekers dropped to just 4 percent 
in 1993 — the issue of illegal immigration will be exacerbated. Around half the 
asylum seekers have been from Europe, mainly from Romania and the former 
Yugoslavia, and the rest have been non-whites from Asia, Africa and Latin 
America.
Whilst most would accept the fact that unrestricted access to settle and work in 
another country is no longer a realistic possibility, the criticism of Britain has 
been that its legislation has been covertly racial in tone. The charge is that it is 
much more difficult for a non-white to settle in Britain compared with someone 
whose skin is white. Furthermore, the charge of racism is compounded by the 
fact that legislation has traditionally given considerable discretion and leeway to 
officials to make their own judgements about individuals — for example, Entry 
Clearance Officers in British Embassies have the power to turn down applicants 
(even for relatively innocuous applications such as a visitor’s visa) without any 
right of appeal. There is a belief, mistaken or otherwise, that officials favour 
whites. In 1985, the Commission for Racial Equality estimated that non-whites 
were 30 times more likely to be denied entry than whites.
It is also true that those with substantial financial resources are easily able to 




























































































resources is nothing new. For example, the 1905 Aliens Act gave the power to 
exclude so-termed ‘undesirables’, but only those travelling on the cheapest 
steerage passage were affected. The principle that money is associated with 
desirability is long established.
The concept of what is meant to be a British subject has always been complex 
and confusing even to legal experts who have spent a lifetime studying the 
subject." Immigration law covers a multiplicity of issues and we can only 
cover the barest details here. The concept of citizenship was not really defined 
until the landmark 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act. Citizenship in Britain 
has traditionally been based on the concept of ius soli — the idea that birth in 
the country, not parentage, conferred the right of citizenship. Others have 
determined citizenship on the principle of parentage or ius sanguinis. Britain is 
a country, rather than a Volk. Post-war legislation has seen the gradual erosion 
of the ius soli principle down to the rather mean-spirited proposal in 1981 that 
the children, bom in Britain, of illegal immigrants would be denied citizenship. 
Most countries now operate on a mixture of the two principles to a lesser or 
greater extent. Countries which traditionally have had a history of net emigration 
have operated mainly on a ius sanguinis principle, whereas countries which have 
been net receivers have operated mainly on a ius soli principle, but there are 
exceptions. Where this occurs, the principle of ius sanguinis generally works 
against immigrants because their children are denied citizenship of the country 
in which they were bom and spent all their iives — Switzerland is an example 
of that harsh principle. In addition, most countries have a separate set of rules 
concerning naturalisation, whereby a foreign resident can apply for citizenship. 
In Britain, the normal requirement is five years of legal residence.
The first major piece of post-war legislation was the 1948 British Nationality 
Act. It created the concept of the ‘Commonwealth Citizen’ or British subject, 
based around the old Empire, with an unrestricted right of access to settle and 
work. At the time there were concerns about labour shortages and population 
decline. Immigration was to be encouraged, not restricted. In fact, the actual 
number of New Commonwealth arrivals was small, but these were concentrated 
in small inner city areas. They met with hostility and prejudice from local 
people. As early as 1948 there were outbreaks of violence in Liverpool, but the 
watershed event was the 1958 Notting Hill riots. From then on the issue of 
Commonwealth immigration was on the political agenda. The secret history of 
that period and the debates as to how to restrict non-white immigration, without 
appearing to be overtly racial, is now just beginning to be told. 1




























































































The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act controlled immigration from the 
Commonwealth for the first time — although secretly whites were allowed in 
through official discretion. It established a three class voucher system for 
intending immigrants, which were restricted in number. The reality of the 1962 
Act was that it did not restrict immigration, the number of arrivals actually 
increased after the Act. In the 1964 General Election, one Conservative 
candidate overturned a large Labour majority, against the national trend, in the 
Smethwick constituency of Birmingham, by fighting on a shamelessly racist 
ticket.
The lesson of Smethwick was not lost on the new Labour government, despite 
the unprecedented denouncement of the newly elected MP for Smethwick by the 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The twin approach of legislation to enhance the 
rights of those living in Britain and legislation to restrict new arrivals was 
established. However, existing residents rightly felt that immigration legislation 
stigmatized them as a problem and exacerbated racial tension rather than 
defusing it. The 1965 Immigration Act restricted the number of vouchers to 
8,500 for skilled workers only. Both Labour and Conservative governments 
have, therefore, taken a tough line on the issue of immigration.
The period since then has been marked by further restrictions and closing of 
loopholes. The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act dealt specifically with East 
African Asians, who, as British passport holders had been exempt from previous 
legislation. Only 1,500 vouchers were issued for this class of person. Ironically, 
it was felt that this actually encouraged immigration as many sought to enter the 
country before restrictions were imposed. The 1968 Act was important because 
it introduced the principle that only those who could demonstrate a close 
ancestral tie with Britain were to be admitted. This, de facto, introduced a racial 
element into immigration law because whites were necessarily better able to 
demonstrate such a tie. The 1971 Immigration Act consolidated the earlier 
legislation and formalised the idea of patriality — to establish the right of abode 
it was necessary that at least one grandparent or parent was bom in Britain. 
Clearly, such a principle discriminated against non-whites. Fryer (1984) called 
it "another piece of nakedly discriminatory legislation". It also gave new powers 
to immigration officers and the police to exclude those they thought undesirable.
The 1981 British Nationality Act was specifically designed to deal with the 
problem of Hong Kong. It created the status of British citizen, with a right of 
abode and other categories of British Nationality, with no associated right of 
abode. In effect, citizens of British Dependent Territories were to be denied the 
right of abode. Again the Act was blatantly discriminatory because two 




























































































explicitly made exceptions. The 1988 Immigration Act imposed further 
restrictions and gave officials further powers of exclusion and deportation. 
Immigrants would now have to demonstrate that they could maintain themselves 
and their families without recourse to public funds. It made it the case that no 
British citizen had the automatic right to be joined by a spouse of either sex. 
In response to the growth of asylum seekers, the 1993 Asylum and Immigration 
Appeals Act curtailed the rights of asylum seekers, particularly the right of 
appeal for visitors and students. This has thought to have lead to a recent decline 
in the number of asylum applications, which in peaked at 73,400 in 1991, up 
from 6,200 in 1985. Other European countries have also tightened their own 
rules with a corresponding decline in the number of applications.12
6 The European context
British immigration legislation was a reaction to increasing numbers of non­
whites seeking a new life in the more affluent West. Britain should not be 
viewed in isolation: other European countries have had a significant inflow of 
non-whites and whites.13 For some, for example Algerians in France, Zaireans 
in Belgium, Suranese in Holland, Angolans in Portugal, and Ethiopians in Italy, 
this has been the result of a colonial legacy. West Germany, because of a 
collective guilt about its treatment of Jews and other minorities in the second 
World War, has had, until recently, particularly liberal policies concerning those 
seeking political asylum and has attracted considerable numbers as a result. For 
example, in 1992 there were 438,000 asylum seekers in Germany alone, though 
the majority of these were white.
Post-war Europe has seen two types of immigration. The first type has been 
poor whites from other parts of Europe — the so-called guestworker system, 
whereby the workers were seen as a temporary response to labour shortages and 
were expected to eventually return home. Official attitudes reflected this view 
of the guestworker with these individuals given few rights. For example, they 
were not permitted to bring their families and could be made to leave once the 
job was no longer available. Switzerland, with around 20 percent foreign 
resident workers, the largest of any European country, has often been accused
12 Eurostat (1996a).
13 We focus on Europe, but the phenomenon appears universal. Australia abandoned its 
racist, whites only policy in 1973, and amendments to United States rules in 1965 has meant 
the arrival of new populations from non-traditional sources. Castles and Miller (1993) 




























































































of exporting its unemployment when recession strikes. Now three quarters of its 
foreign workers have the right of permanent residence, so this is no longer true.
Britain too has always had significant white immigration. After the war, a large 
number of Poles and Italians were admitted and there has always been a steady 
influx from the Old Commonwealth countries. However, the main source of 
white immigration has been Ireland. Many of these whites were easily 
assimilated, although the Irish are, as will be seen are something of an 
exception. Unlike the guestworker system, the majority of British immigrants 
enjoyed full rights as citizens, and in particular the right of family reunion.
The second source has been non-whites from outside of Europe and as the 
guestworker system went into decline in the early 1970s, so the proportion of 
non-whites among the immigrant population of Europe has increased. In Britain, 
it has been family reunion of dependants that has been responsible for the more 
recent inflows of non-European immigrants, with asylum seekers another source 
in the rest of Europe.
It is also evident that racism is prevalent within the EU, and that the head’ine 
grabbing incidents of murderous racist attacks are just an extreme manifestation 
of a more generalised hostility. Marie (1995), acting as the EU official 
summariser on immigration issues, wrote that, "Intolerance is mounting in all 
countries and all sections of the community". The EC passed a joint declaration 
against racism and intolerance in 1986; the fact that it was thought necessary 
speaks volumes for the state of European race relations. One result of this 
declaration was to commission a survey of the 12 member states concerning 
individual attitudes carried out in 1988.14 Around 5 percent considered 
immigration to be the major issue, compared with 49 percent who considered 
unemployment to be the most pressing. Opinion on racism was very polarised, 
with 10 percent approving of racist parties to some extent, whereas 82 percent 
disapproved. However, over half considered that some groups of ‘others’ in their 
own country were too large. However, at governmental level most European 
countries make racism a criminal offence, so, like Britain, the policy seems to 
be to limit numbers, whilst at the same time attempting to promote the economic 
integration of minority groups.15
14 Commission (1989).
15 A survey of the legislative framework across the major European and other OECD 





























































































Despite the convergence of national policies, Britain, as with much EU policy, 
is suspicious of a common European approach to immigration. The government 
wishes to retain the right to screen all entrants to the UK. Thus the proposal that 
all internal frontiers in the EU be abolished by 2001, with a ‘fortress Europe’ 
for outside borders, is strongly opposed. Britain sees border controls as a matter 
for national, not European, policy.
7 Facts about Britain’s ethnic minorities
Tables (5) and (6) present a summary of some key statistics by ethnic group for 
males and females for the working age population for 1991 (16-64 for males and 
15-59 for females). It also shows the sample sizes. The data are derived from 
the Sample o f Anonymised Records (SARs) from the 1991 Census. The SARs 
consist of a 2 percent sample of individuals and a 1 percent sample of 
households from the full Census and these are combined here to give the largest 
possible sample. No individual can appear in both the individual and household 
SARs. Almost 95 percent of the male and female samples are accounted for by 
whites, with the percentage of non-white females slightly higher than the 
corresponding male figure. Indians are easily the largest non-white group. The 
proportion of non-whites in the working population has grown considerably and 
will continue to do so. In 1979 the figure was 3.9 percent and this rose to 5.9 
percent in 1994. The reason for the growth is the younger age structure of the 
ethnic minorities and their tendency to have more children. There would be very 
little contribution from net immigration, because of the severe restrictions put 
in place. Working age ethnic minorities are somewhat younger on average than 
whites, but the difference is not particularly large.
Over 75 percent of the total male sample are in employment, but this hides a 
large degree of variation among ethnic groups. Black-Africans are the only 
group to have less than half of their male population in work. 
Pakistanis/Bangladeshis do not fair much better since they just squeeze over the 
50 percent mark. The remainder of the groups have over 60 percent in 
employment but they all lag behind whites, who have 76.8 percent of males in 
employment. For females, Black-Caribbeans possess a higher proportion in 
employment than whites. However, this does not prevent over half of the total 
population of minorities being classified as out of employment. Only 17.3 
percent of Pakistani/Bangladeshi females are involved in various forms of 
employment, which reflects the special isolation of this group. Given the under­
representation of ethnic groups in employment, the next question is how this 




























































































The two biggest factors explaining employment differences among males are 
variations in unemployment rates and variations in the proportion of students. 
Both tend to be high for the minority groups, but note that the generally younger 
age structure of the ethnic minorities accounts for some of these variations, 
particularly the student population. These two factors are important for females 
as well, but much larger variations in activity rates are also apparent. Possible 
reasons for the higher student percentages include the fact that ethnic groups 
defer entry into the labour market because of a fear of discrimination and the 
presence of a high number of foreign students who will return to their country 
of origin, but who, in principle, should be counted on the Census day. The 
highest student percentage of all belongs to the Chinese with Black-Africans 
trailing closely behind. For males, the percentage of students from ethnic 
minorities is more than twice that of white students but this discrepancy is not 
so great for females. Leslie and Drinkwater (1996) have shown that ethnic 
minorities have a taste for education over and above the discouraged worker 
effect coming from higher unemployment rates.
The information about unemployment comes from the question ‘Whether 
working, retired, looking after the home etc last week’. Unemployment is the 
aggregate of the positive responses to ‘Was waiting to start a job he/she had 
already accepted’ and ‘Was unemployed and looking for a job’. This latter 
question is somewhat vague because, unlike the International Labour 
Organisation definition, which is used in the quarterly LFS, there is no specific 
edict concerning how long ago a job was sought. Consequently, it might be 
expected that this somewhat looser definition might elicit a somewhat higher 
response rate. Green (1995) confirms this. In April 1991, the Employment 
Department claimant count was 2,099,400, the LFS count 2,302,300 and the 
Census count 2,484,500. It is generally agreed that the Census is an accurate 
indicator of true unemployment levels.
A lower percentage of Chinese males and females are unemployed (here 
measured unconventionally as a percentage of the total working population) 
compared with their white counterparts. However, this is not the case if 
unemployment rates, conventionally measured as a percentage of the 
economically active population and shown in parentheses in the two tables, are 
considered. This difference is due to the high proportion of students alluded to 
previously. Otherwise, whites possess the lowest unemployment rates for both 
males and females. For males, the three Black groups and 
Pakistanis/Bangladeshis have over 20 percent of their populations classed as 
unemployed. The conventionally measured unemployment rate for non-whites 
is 21.2 as opposed to 11.0 for whites. Female unemployment rates are lower but 




























































































though only 7.9 percent of Pakistani/Bangladeshi females are unemployed this 
still translates to a conventional unemployment rate of 31.4 because of the 
extremely high inactivity rate of this group.
The final column in each of the tables refers to the percentage who are inactive, 
namely those permanently sick, retired or otherwise inactive. Over 11 percent 
of Pakistani/Bangladeshi males fall into this category. However, five of the other 
ethnic groups have lower male inactivity rates compared with whites. For 
females, this only applies to three of the groups. 63.4 percent of 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi females are inactive. The principal explanation for this 
finding is cultural; Muslim women are expected to remain at home after leaving 
school and prepare for marriage.16 Coupled with higher than average 
unemployment and student percentages this leads to less than one in every five 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi females being in employment. This actually represents an 
increase compared with previous years, so the traditional barriers are breaking 
down, albeit slowly. There is clear evidence that this group is somehow special, 
which the later formal analysis will confirm.
Males and females can be compared by calculating a number of correlation 
coefficients across the two tables. The correlation coefficient between the 
percentage of males in employment and the percentage of females in 
employment is 0.686, which is significant at the 5 percent level. Similar 
coefficients are obtained for other pairwise correlations; male and female 
unemployment rates is 0.898 and the percentage of male and female students is 
0.930. A smaller and insignificant coefficient is obtained by correlating the 
percentage of inactive males and inactive females, which is 0.577. These results 
suggest that there are equally strong ethnicity effects affecting economic position 
as well as gender differences.
8 Differences between immigrants and British born ethnic minorities
The lower portions of Tables (5) and (6) introduce country of birth into the 
analysis. Whites are split into those bom in the UK, those bom abroad 
(excluding Ireland) and the Irish. Non-whites are also divided into UK bom and 
foreign bom. UK bom whites appear to do the best in terms of economic 
position and UK bom non-whites the worst. The percentage of UK bom non­
whites who are unemployed or students is particularly high. Why foreign bom 
non-whites should fare better than UK bom is a matter of debate and a cause for




























































































concern. The crude evidence of Tables (5) and (6) lends support to the Borjas 
(1986) pessimistic view of non-assimilation. There is not much prima facie 
evidence that second generation British bom ethnic minorities are becoming 
better assimilated, at least in terms of employment. How this group will fare is 
an important question, because they will increasingly come to dominate the 
ethnic labour force. As of 1991, the numbers of British bom among the ethnic 
minorities active in the labour market were comparatively small and 
concentrated in the younger age categories. Section 16 explores the issue in 
more depth.
9 How accurate are the Census data?
Unlike the LFS, the Census is not a small sample of the population, rather the 
aim is to record the whole population. However, 100 percent coverage is never 
possible and non-response turned out to be particularly severe in the 1991 
Census. The Poll Tax, and the strong motivation not to be conspicuous, were 
possible reasons for the large undercount. There are two types of missing data 
contained in Census records. First, is the case of incomplete census forms. 
Rather than simply have missing data, the solution has been to impute missing 
values based on what a household with those particular characteristics might be. 
For example, marital status would be imputed on the basis of age and so on. 
In 1.6 percent of cases whole households were imputed, where the enumerator 
failed to locate the residents. Although better than simply ignoring these 
households, such a procedure is unlikely to be very accurate.
The second, more serious, error consists of those missed altogether.17 
Furthermore, it is estimated that the Census Validation Survey, designed to 
locate the missing observations, found just 20 percent of unrecorded cases. 
Numbers in the armed forces are a notorious example where the raw Census 
count and Ministry o f  Defence returns far from tally. This issue would be less 
important if all ethnic groups were similarly underenumerated since relative 
proportions would be the same, but this is not the case. Illegal immigrants would 
hardly be keen to respond, despite assurances of confidentiality. Furthermore, 
according to Tye (1995), "Because of the heavy concentration of both census 
non-response and ethnic minority groups in England in urban areas there are 
higher levels of non-response among the ethnic minorities". Simpson and 
Dorling (1994) have estimated, using a set of correction factors based on a set





























































































of reasonable assumptions, that the non-white ethnic population is 
underestimated by 4.9 percent, whereas the white population is underestimated 
by 2.1 percent. The unemployment count is underestimated by 4.0 percent. 
Non-white unemployment is consequently disproportionately under-represented.
10 Exploring inter-ethnic unemployment differences
The huge sample size of the SARs provides a unique opportunity to ask some 
general questions about inter-ethnic unemployment differences. For the first time 
a multivariate analysis of separate female ethnic groups is undertaken consistent 
with the male analysis. A separate all-white minority group is also included, 
namely those whose country of birth was Ireland. It can be seen from Tables (5) 
that this group also has a high unemployment rate and serves to illustrate the 
complexity of the issue. It is not just a white versus black problem.
There are three broad explanations for higher ethnic unemployment rates. The 
first is characteristics and this seems to be the official view of the government 
for inter-ethnic differences. The then Dept o f Employment in its Gazette (June 
1995, page 256) stated that, "Factors which may explain the persistently higher 
rates of unemployment among ethnic minorities, apart from the younger age 
profile ... include ethnic minorities’ generally lower level of qualifications and 
their industrial and regional distribution". It will later be shown that 
characteristics explain only a part of the differences seen in Tables (5) and (6).
The second explanation is discrimination. Direct evidence of this can be found 
in the revealing study of Brown and Gay (1985), where a coloured immigrant 
with exactly the same qualifications as a native white was sent out to apply for 
a variety of jobs. In two-thirds of cases when the white received a positive 
response, the black applicant was discriminated against to the extent that the 
employer would often lie that the post had already been filled. There is also 
direct survey evidence, confirming the widespread prevalence of discrimination. 
The British Social Attitudes Survey (averaged over the years 1983-91) has shown 
that over 50 percent of the population considered there to be a lot of prejudice 
against non-whites — even though much smaller numbers were prepared to admit 
to themselves being prejudiced. This study will show that discrimination and 
characteristics can not account for all of the inter-ethnic unemployment 
differences — something else is involved.
Discrimination is all about the majority acting against a minority group, but a 
third factor also impinges namely the cultural outlook of the minority group 




























































































He argues that different groups will take time to assimilate to the majority 
culture. For example, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups are of relatively 
recent arrival compared with other groups. The first step on the road to 
assimilation is for people to work for and cater to the needs of one’s own ethnic 
group. Language difficulties and a stricter religious outlook would serve to 
exacerbate this tendency for the minority group to be more isolated and inward 
looking. The theoretical model will show how this taste for isolation can lead 
to higher equilibrium unemployment rates. It is apparent that a taste for isolation 
will limit economic opportunities and higher unemployment rates are a natural 
consequence. The higher rates among the predominately Muslim 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi group, which also has the largest problem with the English 
language, can be explained by this factor.
11 A theoretical framework
An imperfect information model is outlined to show how higher unemployment 
rates can arise among ethnic groups that are discriminated against and/or have 
a taste for isolation. It is set within the new job matching approach to 
unemployment, as pioneered by Pissarides (1990).
Suppose the money wage for an individual choosing to work outside the enclave 
is q. However, as result of discrimination and the degree of attachment to the 
ethnic enclave, the psychic wage is less than this. Let w = q - D - F  be the 
psychic wage. This is lower because of discrimination as measured by D and 
secondly by the worker’s own distaste with working in the majority sector and 
this is measured by F. Discrimination could come from the employer or fellow 
workers and such unpleasant behaviour serves to make the individual feel worse 
off. Similarly, F represents the taste for isolation and has the same effect of 
lowering the psychic wage.
The framework does not preclude the possibility that discrimination could lead 
to a lower q as well as a lower psychic wage — the Becker (1971) perfect 
information framework which first introduces the useful concept of a 
discrimination coefficient, examines this idea. Here the focus of attention is the 
complementary idea of an unemployment differential. The important point is that 
there need be no association between the reservation wage and the level of D. 
In practice, there is a strong negative association between earnings and 
unemployment for males across ethnic groups and little or no association for 





























































































It is assumed that an unemployed worker does not know an individual firm’s 
discrimination coefficient when searching for a job. This coefficient is only 
revealed to an individual once a contact is made with the firm. This captures the 
idea of imperfect information and of workers requiring time to distinguish good 
from bad employers. Unemployed workers do, however, have information on the 
overall distribution of D. The employers’ discrimination coefficients are 
distributed according to <t>(D), where D lies in the interval 0 < D < m .  Given the 
linear relationship between w and D the density function of wage offers, <t>(w), 
will have the same functional form as <t>(D).
Following Pissarides (1990), let U be an unemployed worker’s expected return 
to search and R the discounted value from employment at the psychic wage w. 
Faced with this psychic wage, therefore, an unemployed worker will accept a job 
if R > LJ. The reservation wage is defined as that wage at which R = U. Hence 
all jobs that offer a wage greater than the reservation wage will have R >  U and 
will thereby be acceptable to the individual. By construction this also implies 
that there is a critical value of discrimination £f, such that only those jobs where 
D < Ef meet the reservation wage criterion.
Given that an unemployed worker receives UB in unemployment benefit, the 
expected present value of search for an unemployed worker is equal to
U = I((/S + X(E(R\D <, D c) -  Uj). (5)
Cf is the maximum value of employer discrimination above which any job offer 
will be refused and X is defined as the probability of an unemployed worker 
receiving a job offer where D < Hf. If one offer is received period then this 
probability is
X = j o° ‘<KD)dD. («)
The present value to the individual of accepting a job offer yielding w is given 
by
R = l(w+s(U-R)), (7)
r
where s is the exogenously given job separation probability, 0 < s < 1. To 
locate the critical value Cf which makes it just worthwhile to accept a wage 
offer, let Hf be the critical value that makes R = U. Given this then from eq.(7)




























































































By talcing a conditional expectation of eq.(7), and using eq.(5), we can substitute 
for U in eq.(8) to give
D c = (q_f) _  (r+s)UB+>E(w\DiiDc) (9)
r+s+\
Appendix (2) shows that X is decreasing w.r.t. F  and UB. Furthermore, the 
equilibrium unemployment rate for an ethnic group characterised in this way is
This is decreasing in X. Consequently, the greater the degree of discrimination 
and the greater the taste for isolation, the higher will be the equilibrium 
unemployment rate.
12 A multivariate analysis of unemployment differences
The model has shown one way in which discrimination and a taste for isolation 
can exacerbate unemployment levels over and above any characteristic 
differences. This section attempts to disentangle these three effects. This will 
be done for males and females separately. The theory has shown that the 
discrimination effect, driven by the majority, and the taste for isolation effect, 
driven from within the enclave, are complementary and it will necessarily be 
difficult to separate these. Looking at a number of separate ethnic groups helps 
disentangle the two factors, rather than simply comparing a broad aggregate non­
white group with the dominant majority. The idea is to separate out the 
characteristic effect from the two other factors. When this is done, it turns out 
that there are still significant unemployment differences across some ethnic 
groups, in particular between the Indian and the Pakistani/Bangladeshi groups. 
It is argued that this reflects a different taste for isolation because it is unlikely 
that the latter group suffers from a higher degree of discrimination.
Logit analysis is used to measure how more or less likely individuals from 
minority groups are to be unemployed after taking their characteristics into 
account. The underlying methodology is well-known and has been applied by 
Nickell (1980) to produce a summary picture of unemployment among British 
males.




























































































P(Y)  = 1 (11)
1 + exp-(arXj>)
where P(Y) is the probability of the rth individual from the Tth ethnic group 
being unemployed and where ar is a vector of estimated coefficients and A* is 
an associated vector of characteristics. A separate logit model is fitted for 
individuals for each separate ethnic group. A set of coefficients will then be 
associated with each ethnic group and the next stage is to determine how much 
of any difference in the mean unemployment probability is due to differences 
in characteristics and how much is due to differences in how particular 
characteristics are rewarded - the coefficient effect. The latter quantity is 
identified as the composite D and F  effect.
A modified version of the Gomulka and Stem (1990) decomposition is used to 
achieve this purpose. Suppose, in the absence of a D  and F  effect, that the 
vector of coefficients associated with individual characteristics would be a  for 
everyone, but that the observed vector of coefficients is a 1, for group Y andaz 
for group Z, where Y can be thought of as the dominant low unemployment 
advantaged group and Z as the discriminated against and less assimilated 
minority. For a given set of characteristics, the change in the probability of 
unemployment in a move to complete assimilation would be
Az = P (a 'X z) -  P(dzX z) ,  <12>
where X* is the vector of characteristics and a corresponding equation would 
exist for the comparison Y group. Construct this probability for each individual 
and then find the average probability for each group. The difference in these 
average probabilities is then
A z  -  l r = [P(cirX r) -  P(azXz)] + [P(a'Xz) -  P(a 'Xr)]. ( 1 3 )
The first term in square brackets is seen to be the difference in the mean 
predicted probabilities of the two groups. In the logit equation this is the same 
as the difference in the sample unemployment rates.18 The non-discriminatory 
vector is unobservable, but following Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), the following 
relationship is assumed to hold for a ’
18 In probit analysis this is not necessarily true, but in practice the difference turns out 





























































































Osasl . (14)= aar + (1 - a)az
The conjecture embodied in eq.(14) is that the complete assimilation would 
mean that a ’ would lie somewhere between the advantaged dominant group 
vector and the disadvantaged group. Substituting into eq.(13) and re-arranging 
gives the following decomposition formula
I r - i z = Az - l Y + [Piaa1 + (1 - a)az)Xr - P(aar + (1 - a)az)Xz], (15)
where i r - / z is the difference in sample unemployment rates. The Gomulka and 
Stem decomposition can be seen to be a further specialism of this general 
formula. The first specialism sets a = 1. In this case, it can be seen that A1 = 0; 
it is assumed that there are no losses to the dominant group in a move to non­
discrimination. The last term in square brackets is then that part of the difference 
in means accounted for by decomposing characteristics using the dominant group 
coefficients. The discrimination term, which is Az, is then just the residual part 
of eq.(15). This is the decomposition of coefficients using group Z characteristics 
as can seen directly from eq.(13).
The second specialism sets a — 0. In this case the presumption is that the 
removal^ of discrimination means that the minority group experience no change; 
that is Az = 0 and it is the majority group’s coefficients which change to that of 
the minority group. Characteristics are now decomposed using minority group 
coefficients as weights and the change in the majority group’s unemployment 
probability ( - Ar in this case) is measured as the difference in coefficients 
decomposed around the dominant group’s characteristics.
The first specialism is the more plausible. It can be seen from Tables (5) and (6) 
that non-whites constitute a small minority of the workforce and that overall 
unemployment rates differ little from that of the indigenous white majority. 
Becker (1971) has also argued that, where the minority is small in number, the 
majority of the gains accrue to the minority group with the majority little 
affected and this idea was also seen in Section 2 in the context of earnings. If 
it were possible to identify a value for a other than the extreme values 
considered here, the discrimination terms could be computed directly from 
eq.(12) but remembering that two values would have to be constructed, one for 
the deterioration in the dominant groups’s prospects and one for the 
improvement in the minority group. In other countries, where the discriminated 




























































































or the case of Catholics in Northern Ireland, such an exercise might be useful.19 
However, the presumption that discrimination represents exploitation and its 
removal means that things become worse for the majority reflects a particular 
view which may not actually be true. Thurow (1969) favours the view that 
whites will lose out. However, all groups can possibly benefit from a better 
degree of assimilation. So the correct coefficient is not just a question of relative 
numbers. In the British context, however, it is surely reasonable to assume the 
value of a to be at or near to 1. The decompositions reported in Tables (8) and
(9) show the a = 1 case.
13 The logit equation and unemployment differences
The controlling characteristics used in the logit equations are:
(1) Age. Four banded dummies were used.
(2) Region.
(3) Whether bom outside UK.
(4) Carer. This concerns carers in the household, where there is another person 
in the household reporting a long-term health problem and the individual is in 
good health.
(5) Long term-illness. This refers to the health of the individual.
(6) Marital status.
(7) Car ownership.
(8) Type of housing tenure.
(9) Qualifications. The Census collects limited information on qualifications. 
They are split into three levels (a) higher degrees (b) first degrees and (c) 
qualifications obtained at 18+ which are above GCE A level standard, but below 
first degree standard.
(10) Family Type.
(11) Moved in the last year. This refers to mobility within the UK, but includes 
a very small number who moved from abroad.
Table (7) is a summary logit, which pools the data and includes separate ethnic 
dummies to account for racial unemployment differences. The decomposition 
analysis is based on a separate logit equation fitted for each group. The signs 
and magnitudes obtained from the coefficients in the model are those which are 
to be expected, with most of the coefficients producing highly significant t-
19 Armstrong and Murphy (1994) document the facts concerning employment 




























































































statistics. This illustrates the advantage of the huge sample sizes for both males 
and females.
A useful interpretation of the coefficients is provided by the columns showing 
the probability of unemployment for males and females. The probabilities for an 
individual in the default category is contained in the constant term. This 
produces probabilities of unemployment of 10.6 percent for males and 5.5 
percent for females, in fact fairly close to the sample means. The default is 
someone aged 32-39, living in the South East, British bom, in good health and 
not caring for a sick person, married, car-owner, owner occupier paying a 
mortgage, no qualifications, no children, not moved in the last year and white. 
An identical procedure is then undertaken for each variable with the only 
difference to the default category being that characteristic associated with the 
variable itself. For example, being a Pakistani/Bangladeshi rather than White 
raises the unemployment probability to 26.7 percent for males and 19.4 percent 
for females. The unemployment probabilities for all ethnic minority groups are 
higher apart from Irish females and for most by a considerable margin.
The relationship between age and unemployment takes the usual U-shape, 
reflecting diminished employment opportunities for individuals at the two 
extremes of the age distribution. There is a regional variation in unemployment 
incidence with greater incidence occurring in the North — so there is nothing of 
great surprise about the regional/age distribution. These findings give reassurance 
about the quality of this less frequently used data set in economic analysis.
The bom outside UK variable is, as argued before, of considerable importance. 
However, in these two ‘grand’ regressions it must be carefully interpreted and 
does to some extent illustrate the limitations of the summary approach. At face 
value this coefficient suggests that foreign bom do worse, but the problem is that 
this includes both white and non-white foreign bom. What is of more interest 
is the difference between foreign bom and UK bom individuals restricted to just 
the ethnic minorities. When a separate logit is fitted for the minority groups 
only, this produced a negative and significant coefficient for males and a 
positive but insignificant coefficient for females. This suggests that UK bom 
males from an ethnic minority experience a higher incidence of unemployment 
compared with their foreign bom counterparts. This result is qualified somewhat 
at a later stage.
The positive and highly significant coefficient attached to the long-term ill 
variable is not unexpected. The Carer variable suggests that having to look after 
another household member increases the risk of unemployment. Notice that the 




























































































it is remembered that female carers are more likely to describe themselves as 
economically inactive rather than unemployed.
Household composition is also found to have an effect on unemployment. 
Individuals who are single, divorced or widowed are more likely to be 
unemployed than their married counterparts because employers often view 
marriage as imposing increased responsibility on the individual and therefore see 
this group as more reliable. Married persons are also likely to be more motivated 
as are heads of households. Not being part of a family — independent of marital 
status — also raises the probability of unemployment. The presence of children 
increases the probability of unemployment and more strongly so if there are 
dependent children. This would suggest that the increased replacement ratio 
effect from social security benefits which accompanies more children outweighs 
the need to work harder to support the family. An interesting finding is that 
cohabiting couples with no children have a lower incidence of unemployment 
than their married counterparts. We offer no explanation for this observation! 
Although the coefficient on a lone parent is positive and significant, the 
problems of this group seem to be somewhat exaggerated since the coefficient 
is less than that of all single people. Not surprisingly, lone mothers are in a 
worse position than lone fathers.
Household tenure is thought to be a major determinant of labour mobility and 
will, therefore, influence the incidence of unemployment. Residents who live in 
council accommodation (that is publicly owned housing rented out on favourable 
terms) are the least geographically mobile and this is confirmed by the large 
positive coefficient on this variable. Apart from this direct effect, it is also clear 
that living in council accommodation will be correlated with other 
characteristics, not otherwise controlled for, which makes employment less 
likely. It is difficult to be precise as to what the source of this lack of work ethic 
is, but what cannot be denied is the fact of its existence. Living in owner 
occupied housing also seems to make the occupier more dynamic in the labour 
market. Males who rent their accommodation as part of their job or business are 
most likely to be in employment but the female coefficient is insignificant.
Qualifications are an important component of a model of this type. The 
attainment of higher qualifications considerably reduces the incidence of 
unemployment but notice there does not appear to be much of a cumulative 
return effect as the coefficients and t-statistics on one and two or more 
qualifications are very similar. Car ownership has a very strong negative 
influence on unemployment, but in reality most people have access to a car, so 




























































































inhibits job search and also lack of a car could be an indicator of a non- 
materialistic outlook.
The remaining ethnic dummy variables are what are of main interest to this 
study. They show that whites experience a significantly lower incidence of 
unemployment compared with all groups apart from Black-Caribbean females, 
Irish females, Chinese males and females, after accounting for characteristic 
differences. O f these, only the coefficient on Irish females is negative. The 
highest coefficients for both males and females are possessed by 
Pakistanis/Bangladeshis, followed by Indians and Black-Africans. The situation 
of Indians is a very interesting one. Given the small unemployment difference 
compared with whites revealed in Tables (5) and (6), one might have expected 
a small coefficient on the Indian dummy, but this is not the case. This issue will 
be discussed in greater detail in the decomposition analysis.
As always in a study of this type there is an issue of whether all the explanatory 
variables are truly exogenous. Car ownership and housing tenure are two cases 
in point. Elsewhere, Leslie and Field (1992), have defended the idea that it is 
lack of car ownership that restricts job search, rather than unemployment 
generating car loss. Housing tenure is rather more problematic. Unemployed 
workers are more likely to qualify for council housing and are less likely to have 
the resources necessary for house purchase. The logit equations have all been re­
run dropping these contentious variables. There is little change, though, not 
surprisingly, there is a somewhat larger role for coefficients in the 
decompositions. A final point is that others have used and defended the use of 
housing tenure in similar models, for example Nickell (1980) and McCormick 
(1983).
14 Decomposition analysis
The decompositions are shown in Table (8) for males and females separately. 
This compares whites with various minority groups, apart from the final column 
which compares Indians with Pakistani/Bangladeshis.20 The table also contains
20 A slight complication arose for Chinese males and the three Black and 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi female groups. Some characteristic terms were dropped from the logit 
due to the perfect prediction problem. The Gomulka Stern decomposition works, but is 
potentially misleading in that it imposes a zero coefficient for the non-white groups whose 
characteristics were dropped, loading in favour of a coefficient effect. The results here are 
based on imposing the white coefficients for those missing characteristics; in effect imposing 
a zero coefficient effect for the problem characteristics. In practice the correction is very 




























































































a x2 likelihood ratio test for the joint hypothesis of coefficient equality. The 
hypothesis of common slope coefficients is rejected for whites and each of the 
minority groups apart from Chinese females. As noted previously, the 
decompositions use case 1, where a — 1. Males are first considered.
The mean unemployment differential between whites and the three black groups 
is at least 14 percent. Characteristics are dominant for Black-Others and Black- 
Caribbeans, whereas for Black-Africans coefficients dominate slightly. Notice 
also that the Black-Other group consists in the main of UK bom workers — 71 
percent for males and 75 percent for females. There is nothing in these findings 
to suggest any greater degree of better assimilation for this group. Indians only 
experience a slightly higher unemployment rate compared with whites (3.3 
percent). The decomposition of this differential proves particularly interesting 
as it indicates that Indians enjoy more favourable employment enhancing 
characteristics compared with whites. This observation implies that if Indians 
possessed white coefficients then the Indian unemployment rate would be lower 
than the white rate. Pakistanis/Bangladeshis suffer a far higher unemployment 
differential (20 percent) than Indians. Although they have less favourable 
characteristics compared with whites, over 75 percent of the difference can still 
be explained by coefficient differences.
The Chinese are in a similar position to the Indians in the sense that their small 
unemployment disadvantage is the result of them possessing more favourable 
characteristics compared with whites but the lower return to these characteristics 
more than offsets this — but note that these differences are tiny compared to 
other groups. The Chinese seem to be the most successful of all the ethnic 
minorities, despite the fact that they seem to be just as isolated from the majority 
as other groups. One explanation is the Chinese entrepreneurial tradition, giving 
ready access to capital, and a high value placed on education and qualifications. 
The Other Asian group has marginally worse characteristics but the bulk of the 
difference is again accounted for by coefficients. The opposite is true for the 
Irish where the majority of their differential with whites is explained by their 
less favourable characteristics. However, the Irish are by no means fully 
assimilated, so marginalisation is not just a question of skin colour. Other work 
of ours using the Labour Force Survey confirms this. Treating minorities as a 
single group, around two-thirds of their unemployment differential with whites 
is accounted for by coefficient differences. This demonstrates the point that





























































































separating into ethnic groups provides far more revealing detail, because of the 
wide differences across these groups.
For females, the unemployment differential between the combined minority 
groups and whites is smaller than for males. Coefficient differences still 
dominate but this effect is not as strong as it is for males. Otherwise, the results 
are consistent with those observed for males. Characteristic differences are the 
more important source of the unemployment differential between the black 
groups and whites, while coefficient differences continue to dominate for Asian 
females. However, unlike their male counterparts, Indian and Chinese females 
do not possess more favourable characteristics compared with whites. The 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi differential with whites is almost 25 percent, with 
coefficient differences again being the major contributor. The Irish differential 
on the other hand is far lower than it was for males with the 1 percent higher 
unemployment rate almost entirely the result of less favourable characteristics. 
The contrasting employment fortunes of Indian and Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
females is very similar to what was observed for males.
A common theme which appears to be present in both parts of the table is that 
characteristic differences seem to be more important for the blacks and Irish, 
while coefficient differences tend to dominate for Asians. This suggeo.s that 
Asians suffer more discrimination or are less well assimilated in the British 
labour market than groups from other ethnic origins.
The clearest exception to the gender comparisons is the Black-Caribbean group. 
Female coefficients are much smaller than those observed for males, with 
characteristics accounting for the entire unemployment differential. This result 
may reflect a matriarchal culture with women assuming a more dominant bread­
winning role. For example, the number of lone parents among Black-Caribbean 
women of working age is 36 percent compared with a 12 percent sample 
average. This is supported by Holdsworth (1995).21
15 The Pakistani/Bangladeshi group
The final column in Table (8) seeks to explain the considerable unemployment 
differential between Indian and Pakistani/Bangladeshi males. Once again it is
21 We have also undertaken an additional decomposition (not reported) for females based 
on a out of employment/employment dichotomy. For females, becoming inactive is an 
alternative to unemployment. This re-emphasises the special position of Black Caribbean 




























































































found that Pakistanis/Bangladeshis possess less favourable characteristics but the 
majority of the differential is caused by coefficient differences. This difference 
between Indians and Pakistani/Bangladeshis is of considerable interest, because 
it provides confirmation of the point made earlier that differences are not just 
the result of discrimination. It is possible, but unlikely, that the Pakistani group 
is more discriminated against than Indians. This illustrates the complexities of 
Britain’s ethnic minorities. For a variety of reasons, such as a lack of language 
skills, later arrival at a time of economic stagnation, and a taste for isolation 
resulting from a stricter religious observance, the Pakistani group is much less 
assimilated and considerable unemployment differences would still remain in the 
absence of discrimination. What can not be disputed is that this broad brush 
approach successfully identifies considerable inter-ethnic differences and the 
questions that require more extensive case study investigation.
One obvious cultural difference between Indians and Bangladeshi/Pakistanis is 
religion and this may contribute to different degrees of isolation. According to 
Peach (1990), 98 percent of Pakistanis and 90 percent of Bangladeshis are 
Muslim, whereas the figure for Indians is just 10 percent. The latter are mainly 
Hindu or Sikh. Apart from religion, there is the additional factor of language 
which exacerbates the difficulties.
There is no one single index or number that can be quoted to ‘prove’ that 
Muslim groups are more economically isolated than other ethnic minorities. 
Rather the aim here is to build up a general picture from a variety of sources. 
The following is just a sample from a huge literature, much of which is based 
on very small case studies or anecdotal evidence based on a close familiarity and 
knowledge of the Muslim community. Perusing the journals specializing in 
ethnic matters will throw up many studies of Muslim groups. The frequently 
refer to their strong sense of separateness from the majority culture. Peach and 
Glebe (1995) is a good recent example when they speak of the Muslim group 
as being "exceptionally poor and marginalised". They also quote a Harris 
Opinion Poll survey, in which 32 percent of Muslims are reported to prefer to 
live in an exclusively Muslim area.
Muslim communities therefore tend be much more concentrated, particularly in 
urban areas of London, the West Midlands and large Northern conurbations such 
as Manchester and Bradford. Robinson (1986) has shown that within particular 
localities, the Pakistani community is the one that is the most segregated. 




























































































whites, the so-termed index of dissimilarity is highest for the Pakistani group.22 
Robinson also shows that isolation is most often a matter of choice rather than 
necessity, though naturally the presence of racial hostility would exacerbate any 
such tendency.
Peach (1989) also highlights the concentrated nature of the Bangladeshi 
population. Half of their population in London live within the small borough of 
Tower Hamlets. The SARs provide some further evidence. One question asks 
about distance to work. It might be expected that commuting distances would 
be smallest for the more isolated communities and this does indeed turn out to 
be the case. 45.1 percent of Pakistani/Bangladeshi group commute 2 kilometres 
or less to work (or work at home), whereas for the Indian group it is 33.1 
percent. This compares with 34.5 percent for whites. Method of transport also 
provides some further evidence with 14.1 percent of Pakistani/Bangladeshis 
walking to work compared with 8.6 percent of Indians and 7.9 percent for 
whites.
Religious custom means that the Muslim community lends itself to a greater 
degree of economic isolation, whereas other groups are generally much more 
easy going in their religious observance. Burgin and Edson (1967), in an early 
study of the problems facing the newly arrived populations in adapting to the 
British education system, emphasised the religious divide. This desire to remain 
apart in order to retain a distinctive identity has not diminished. In a fascinating 
study, Werbner (1990) describes the alienation felt by British Muslims. Parker- 
Jenkins (1990) still finds a strong desire for the Muslim community to be apart. 
She writes,
"Cultural diversity in Western Societies has provided ample opportunity for 
teaching to reflect different perspectives on the family. Yet for many Muslims 
this approach appears as a competing perspective which challenges and 
undermines their own identity" (p. 570).
Another example of the greater degree of isolation of the Pakistani community 
is to examine participation rates among females. The LFS shows that on average
22 See his Appendix Tables 9.4 — 9.6. The index of dissimilarity is derived from the Gini 
curve. For each tract of interest the proportion of the minority group is calculated and these 
are then cumulated from the lowest to the highest — the Gini curve. The dissimilarity index 
is the maximum distance between the Gini curve and the line of complete equal racial mixing. 
The measure is described in Duncan and Duncan (1955). For Pakistanis the figure was 84.5 
per cent, meaning that roughly that proportion would have to move from their present location 




























































































from 1989-91, 24 percent of Pakistani/Bangladeshi women were economically 
active (up from just 17 percent in 1986) and of these 24 percent were actually 
unemployed so the proportion in work is extremely small. By contrast, 55 
percent of Indian women were active — almost the same as the white proportion 
— and only 10 percent of these were unemployed. Again this reflects a strong 
cultural difference with Muslim women expected to remain at home after leaving 
school and prepare for marriage.23 However, the quite sharply rising 
participation rates do indicate that these centuries old traditions are beginning to 
break down.
Isolation also arises from the special factor of language disadvantage. This is an 
important factor for the Pakistani/Bangladeshi group. Lazear (1995) analyses the 
recent phenomenon of the failure of the language melting pot with Hispanic 
groups in the USA retaining Spanish as a first language. He argues that a rapid 
influx into concentrated areas lowers the incentive to adapt to the indigenous 
language. The validation survey of the 1991 Census, designed to explore the 
reason for non-response among ethnic minorities, found particular language 
difficulties among Asian Muslims. Lack of language restricts opportunities to the 
local enclave.
Reed (1992) has made a special study of the language problems of Pakistani 
South Asians — and the problems of the Bangladeshi groups would be similar. 
The technical term here is ‘dialect interference’ which restricts the cognitive and 
reading abilities of children. According to Reed, the problem for South Asians 
is that they are predominately second language learners, whereas for other ethnic 
groups the indigenous English is a second dialect problem. English is not the 
language spoken at home by the majority of Pakistani/Bangladeshis. Many are 
from a poor rural background and progress in a new language is limited. Reed, 
however, notes that language problems, whilst significant, are gradually being 
overcome but significant disadvantage will remain for a long time. Whitmarsh 
and Harris (1996) give more recent evidence. Whilst the younger age groups 
were able to speak English, only 72 percent of Bangladeshis aged 30-49 were 
fluent. Only 10 percent had English as a first language, compared with 32 
percent of Indians. For Indians, 94 percent of the 30-49 age group were fluent 
in English.
Taylor (1992) reports that Pakistani and Bangladeshi children do significantly 
worse in school and are less likely to have access to higher education. Burgin 
and Edson (1967) show that the largest group of non-English speaking children




























































































admitted to their school was Pakistani. Data from the LFS show that this group 
has the largest proportion of those reporting no formal educational qualifications. 
It is also true that many Muslims are keen on a policy of separate schools for 
their children, further reinforcing the sense of a community isolated from other 
groups.
Information from the Fourth National Survey o f Ethnic Minorities is very 
instructive in this regard, since it elicits information on language ability and 
religious identification. Muslims were more likely to be unemployed than Hindus 
and Sikhs. Unemployment was associated with low levels of skill in English, 
especially among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The latter two groups were less 
likely to speak English well compared with Indians and African Asians.24
Self-employment is another good indicator of non-assimilation. Owen and Green 
(1992) report that self-employment among Pakistani and Bangladeshi people is 
among the highest of any group and Modood et al. (1996) provide more recent 
evidence. In 1981, 30 percent of Bangladeshi males in work were self-employed 
and 29 percent of Pakistanis, compared with 14 percent of Indians. In recent 
years these figures have equalised somewhat, so there is an impression (rising 
female participation rates is another example) of greater integration as second 
and subsequent generations start to reject the old customs. However, a 
considerable gulf still remains.
Rafiq (1992) has made a special study of Muslim and non-Muslim owned Asian 
businesses in the Bradford area and has noted considerable differences. In 
particular, Muslim owned businesses tend to trade among the Muslim 
community with much less contact with other groups. The other feature that 
Rafiq reports is that Muslim owned businesses tend to employ Muslims — only 
18 percent of non-Asians were employed by the larger Asian firms and the small 
firms are, naturally enough, all Muslim.
There is no formal test of isolation and the issue of inter-ethnic differences in 
unemployment is bound to touch on areas that are not purely economic or 
amenable to standard econometric techniques. By adopting a flexible 
investigative technique of formal and informal analysis of evidence, a 
convincing case that characteristics and discrimination alone cannot explain the 
high unemployment rates of some groups has been put forward.
24 This information was supplied to us by Richard Berthoud of the Policy Studies 




























































































It is also clear from Tables (5) and (6) that foreign bom is the one characteristic 
where there are enormous differences across the respective populations, with 
whites dominated by UK bom and non-whites by the bom abroad group. It 
requires only a small difference in coefficients to generate a large characteristic 
effect here. In view of this, it would obviously be a logical next step to further 
differentiate into the UK bom and bom abroad categories for each ethnic group. 
Unfortunately, this is not possible because sample sizes would be too small for 
the UK bom category. Table (9) shows a comparison of the ethnic minorities, 
treated as an aggregate excluding the Irish, split into UK bom and foreign bom. 
As a comparison, UK bom whites and foreign bom whites (excluding the Irish) 
are also compared. The raw unemployment differential for ethnic minority males 
is 9.2 percent and 6.3 percent for females. For whites, there is only a small 
difference in these rates and the decomposition suggests an offsetting coefficients 
and characteristics effect for males, but not unexpectedly there is much greater 
homogeneity in the white samples. UK bom ethnic minorities seem to have a 
significant under-performance.
However, the decomposition analysis paints a much less pessimistic picture. 
Table (9) shows that it is characteristics that totally dominate. In other words, 
the overall position remains ambiguous. It cautions us against the pessimism of 
the raw data, but, on the other hand there is nothing here to support the view 
that UK bom ethnic minorities are better assimilated.25 
This contrasts with the findings on earnings, where the British bom seem to be 
improving.
Some further information from the Gomulka and Stem decomposition would be 
useful, concerning the relative contributions of particular characteristics and 
particular coefficients in the overall decomposition. There are, however, major 
obstacles involved in attempting such an exercise. First of all, Jones (1983) has 
pointed out that it is logically impossible to disentangle the relative coefficient 
contribution, so nothing more can be said here.
Characteristics do not suffer from this ‘units of measurement’ problem. The 
weights attached to particular characteristics are the coefficients; any linear
16 Differences between British and foreign born
25 A disaggregated set of comparisons was attempted for males only. Indian male showed 
about a 'A coefficient effect and for the Pakistani/Bangladeshi group it was exclusively a 
coefficient effect, but this difference was not statistically significant for this second group. 
Thus there is tentative evidence of some additional factor militating against Asians but the 




























































































transformation would leave the relative contributions unchanged. There is, 
however, a problem associated with extracting the contribution of individual 
characteristics from a logit or probit equation. Unlike a linear regression, the 
mean probability cannot simply be summed as separate coefficient times the 
average value of characteristics. An informal solution to the problem was 
therefore adopted. This involved fitting the linear regression model with a one- 
zero dependent variable and exactly the same set of explanatory variables. 
Obviously this is not a well-founded procedure, but in practice it turned out that 
the decomposition into respective components was very close to the logit model. 
Only a small proportion of the predicted values fell outside of the zero-one 
acceptable range. The contribution from characteristics in regression model were 
split into their respective components. This approach is suggestive, rather than 
being strictly correct; nevertheless it provides useful supplementary information.
Which characteristics are important to the overall characteristics effect? 
Applying the linear regression model to Table (9), the characteristics in order of 
importance, for both males and females, are not surprisingly age and marital 
status. Young and single means unemployment prone and that is what the UK 
bom ethnic minorities generally consist of. There is also a lesser role for 
housing tenure and qualifications. Of the four groups, the highest proportion of 
unqualified labour belongs to British bom non-whites. However, with the large 
student population and with the inevitable ageing of the UK bom minority 
population all these characteristics should start to have a beneficial effect on 
employment prospects.
17 Concluding comments
By combining the two separate household and individual Samples o f Anonymised 
Records of the Census, this study has established a lot of very useful information 
about the relative employment prospects of Britain’s ethnic minorities. In 
addition, it offers the first detailed analysis of female ethnic minorities and 
shows that there are equally significant enclave effects for this group and that 
there are equally significant differences as with males.
The ethnic minorities seem to fall into two broad categories. It seems that the 
African groups and the Irish possess less favourable employment enhancing 
characteristics, but there are some additional effects of non-assimilation as 
exemplified by different coefficients attached to particular characteristics. For the 
Asian groups (excepting the Chinese) coefficient differences have a more 




























































































out as particularly disadvantaged. This confirms earlier work and is also 
consistent with their much lower earnings observed in the recently available LFS 
data. This suggests that there are greater amounts of non-assimilation among the 
Asian groups, but we are careful to stress that not all of this comes from 
discrimination. This comes across most clearly in the strongly disadvantaged 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi group where other factors must operate.
A marginalised status is the most serious problem facing immigrants and ethnic 
minorities in Europe today. This analysis has indicated that it can not all be 
conveniently explained away by blaming it all as a characteristic effect. The 
methods of this paper could be transferred to any number of Western European 
countries and similar results would be the most likely outcome. This is a tricky 
and sensitive problem, not least the likely hostile reaction of the majority to any 
policy that smacks of positive discrimination. This paper does not offer any 
quick remedies, because there are none.
Of particular importance is the performance of UK bom ethnic minorities. Our 
finding is that, once characteristic differences have been taken into account, this 
group is doing neither worse nor better than their foreign bom counterparts. 
The UK bom group is of great importance in establishing how well recent 
arrivals have assimilated into the majority culture. It would, however, be of great 
interest to focus on specific groups here. For example, the Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
group does particularly badly, but despite the near one million observations, 
there are only 114 UK bom unemployed females in this group and this is after 
combining the two separate SAR samples; this is hardly enough for any useful 
multivariate analysis. There are even smaller group sizes, for example just 21 
unemployed British bom Chinese males. Relative to the overall cost of the 





























































































Unemployment rates (percent male and female) of foreign and immigrant populations 






















































































































Note: The groups are not exactly comparable to the British definition of an ethnic minority, which include 
British bom members of the ethnic minorities. Own nationals would be excluded here. Also many European 






























































































Unemployment Rates by Ethnic Origin: 1979-1995
Males Females
Year White Non-White White Non-White
1979 4.4 6.0 5.7 10.8
1981 9.7 17.2 8.7 15.8
1983 12 22 10 19
1984 11.3 22.4 11.1 20.4
1985 11.0 21.7 10.4 19.0
1986 11.1 20.5 10.2 19.4
1987 10.7 17.7 9.9 16.3
1988 8.6 14.2 8.2 12.3
1989 6.9 12.7 6.7 11.0
1990 6.6 11.4 6.2 11.0
1991 8.7 16.2 6.9 13.6
1992 11.0 20.0 6.9 13.6
1993 11.7 23.5 7.0 17.2
1994 10.6 24.9 6.8 16.0
1995 9.4 20 6.3 17
Source: Labour Force Survey (1979-83: LFS Reports; 1984-95 and Sly (1996).
Notes: Rates calculated for ILO unemployed aged 16 and over.
Rate=unemp!oyed/(self-employed+employed+unemployed+government 
scheme). Rates are given for Spring of each year (The LFS became quarterly 
in 1992).
There are some methodological and quality differences between the annual 

































































































Foreign bom Whites 6.33 4.76
UK bom Non-Whites 4.47 4.03
Foreign bom Non-Whites 5.03 4.02
Source: Labour Force Survey
Notes: 1. January 1987 prices.




























































































Year of Arrival in UK of Working Age Population by Ethnic Group1
TABLE (4)
Year of Arrival (in percentages)
I ik Prp IQfiO 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Year Not 
StatedBorn Size
Whites 95.61 1.15 1.17 0.84 0.67 0.53 0.03 170118
Black-Caribbeans 46.04 9.07 34.99 5.68 2.81 1.15 0.26 1566
Black-Africans 18.51 1.22 9.46 16.22 30.81 23.24 0.54 740
Black-Other 78.81 1.79 9.25 3.88 3.58 2.69 0.00 335
Indians 16.06 3.37 27.79 33.58 14.66 4.18 0.37 2728
Pakistanis/
Bangladeshis
14.21 1.76 25.39 24.78 25.06 8.31 0.50 1816
Chinese 8.49 0.69 14.91 34.86 26.61 13.76 0.69 436
Other Asians 4.99 1.15 9.98 30.90 25.14 27.83 0.00 521
Other-Others 28.67 4.21 12.91 19.16 18.07 16.98 0.00 736
Non-Whites 23.56 3.62 23.43 23.00 17.11 8.94 0.34 8878
Total 92.04 1.27 2.27 1.94 1.49 0.95 0.04 178996
Source: Labour Force Survey
Notes: 1. The sample consists of 11 pooled quarters of the LFS starting from the Winter of 1992. It contains 












































































































Whites 487903 94.63 38.34 76.75 9.51 (11.0) 5.22 8.52
Black-Caribbeans 4826 0.94 37.50 63.90 21.38 (25.1) 5.22 9.49
Black-Africans 2085 0.40 32.95 46.00 20.48 (30.8) 25.52 8.01
Black-Other 1119 0.22 29.51 61.93 21.18 (25.5) 11.26 5.63
Indians 8213 1.59 36.04 69.86 11.59 (14.2) 11.49 7.05
Pakistanis/Banglads 5281 1.02 34.02 51.64 23.16 (31.0) 13.94 11.27
Chinese 1618 0.31 33.84 61.00 7.66 (11.2) 26.14 5.19
Other Asians 2078 0.40 34.69 64.20 10.97 (14.6) 19.78 5.05
Other-Others 2476 0.48 33.29 62.80 15.19(19.5) 14.94 7.07
Total Non-Whites 27696 5.37 35.14 61.66 16.61 (21.2) 13.70 8.04
Whites bom in UK 466587 90.49 38.27 76.90 9.47(11.0) 5.13 8.49
Whites bom abroad4 15252 2.96 37.54 74.69 8.84 (10.6) 9.40 7.07
Irish Bom Whites 6064 1.18 45.26 70.22 13.95 (16.6) 1.42 14.41
Non-Whites bom in UK 7652 1.48 24.70 51.44 20.35 (28.4) 23.98 4.23
Non-Whites bom abroad 20044 3.89 39.13 65.56 15.18 (18.8) 9.77 9.49
Total Minorities 33760 6.55 36.96 63.20 16.13 (20.3) 11.49 9.18
Whole Sample 515599 100.00 38.17 75.94 9.89 (11.5) 5.68 8.49
Source: Samples o f Anonymised Records (Crown Copyright)
Notes: 1. Consists of full time employees, part time employees, self employed and workers on a governme 
scheme.
2. Unemployment rate in parentheses ie. number of unemployed divided by the employed and tl 
unemployed.
3. Consists of permanently sick, retired and other inactive individuals.












































































































Whites 453321 94.36 36.37 62.82 4.45 (6.6) 5.86 26.87
Black-Caribbeans 5170 1.08 35.32 63.02 9.38 (13.0) 6.79 20.81
Black-Africans 1995 0.42 31.55 43.11 13.98 (24.5) 17.89 25.01
Black-Other 1293 0.27 28.48 52.98 12.37 (18.9) 11.83 22.82
Indians 7800 1.62 34.27 51.65 7.63 (12.9) 10.55 30.17
Pakistanis/Banglads 4724 0.98 33.51 17.32 7.92 (31.4) 11.37 63.40
Chinese 1687 0.35 33.20 50.39 3.91 (7.2) 22.29 23.41
Other Asians 2290 0.48 34.64 47.34 6.68 (12.4) 13.10 32.88
Other-Others 2132 0.44 31.98 48.50 8.16(14.4) 16.04 27.30
Total Non-Whites 27091 5.64 33.44 46.58 8.44 (15.3) 11.96 33.03
Whites bom in UK 431569 89.83 36.31 63.00 4.41 (6.6) 5.81 26.78
Whites born abroad4 16069 3.34 36.01 57.76 5.17 (8.2) 8.63 28.45
Irish Bom 5683 1.18 42.14 63.24 5.24 (7.6) 1.85 29.67
Non-Whites bom in UK 7879 1.64 24.90 46.35 11.38 (19.7) 22.95 19.32
Non-Whites bom abroad 19212 4.00 36.94 46.67 7.23 (13.4) 7.45 38.65
Total Minorities 32774 6.82 34.94 49.47 7.88 (13.8) 10.20 32.45
Whole Sample 480412 100.00 36.21 61.90 4.67 (7.0) 6.20 27.22
Source: Samples o f  Anonymised Records (Crown Copyright)
Votes: 1. Consists of full time employees, part time employees, self employed and workers on a government 
scheme.
2. Unemployment rate in parentheses ie. number of unemployed divided by the employed and the 
unemployed.
3. Consists of permanently sick, retired and other inactive individuals.































































































Mean Coeff. t-stat. Prob. Mean Coeff. t-stat. Prob.
Constant -2.132 78.853 0.106 -2.844 73.715 0.055
Aged 24 or under 0.171 0.303 15.381 0.138 0.198 0.632 22.084 0.099
Aged 25-31 0.187 0.087 4.919 0.115 0.189 0.304 11.515 0.073
Aged 40-49 0.234 -0.095 5.337 0.097 0.258 -0.126 4.783 0.049
Aged 50 or over 0.217 0.218 11.791 0.129 0.163 0.011 0.350 0.056
North 0.053 0.189 7.734 0.125 0.053 0.129 3.626 0.062
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.088 0.193 9.169 0.126 0.087 0.014 0.435 0.056
East Midlands 0.074 0.053 2.249 0.111 0.074 0.020 0.603 0.056
East Anglia 0.038 -0.065 2.016 0.100 0.037 -0.061 1.313 0.052
Inner London 0.042 0.118 4.489 0.118 0.046 0.177 5.065 0.065
Outer London 0.078 0.030 1.261 0.109 0.080 0.040 1.233 0.057
South West 0.083 0.080 3.434 0.114 0.082 0.050 1.495 0.058
West Midlands 0.096 0.079 3.741 0.114 0.094 0.159 5.348 0.064
North West 0.111 0.243 12.446 0.131 0.112 0.247 8.932 0.069
Wales 0.048 0.295 11.410 0.137 0.047 0.212 5.560 0.067
Scotland 0.089 0.446 21.463 0.156 0.091 0.408 13.830 0.080
Bom outside UK 0.075 0.051 1.852 0.111 0.075 0.206 5.995 0.067
111 in household 0.100 0.182 11.413 0.125 0.092 0.186 7.864 0.065
Limiting long-term illness 0.043 0.746 36.264 0.200 0.033 0.857 28.082 0.121
Single 0.312 0.478 22.125 0.161 0.290 0.333 10.997 0.075
Divorced or Widowed 0.065 0.569 21.930 0.173 0.099 0.386 11.817 0.079
Car Owner in household 0.844 -1.092 90.912 0.038 0.839 -0.846 48.811 0.024
Own outright 0.136 0.325 19.842 0.141 0.126 0.167 6.586 0.064
Rented privately 0.061 0.584 28.980 0.175 0.061 0.415 14.633 0.081
Rented with a job or business 0.026 -0.552 12.385 0.064 0.023 -0.002 0.040 0.055
Council House 0.139 1.050 77.068 0.253 0.125 0.810 41.300 0.116
1 higher qualification 0.104 -0.724 30.183 0.054 0.106 -0.620 19.564 0.030
2 or more higher qualifications 0.070 -1.050 29.903 0.040 0.061 -0.781 16.547 0.026




























































































Not part of a family 0.143 0.246 9.316 0.132 0.125 0.324 8.470 0.074 1
TABLE (7) (Contd)
Married with dependent children 0.352 0.179 9.646 0.124 0.312 0.107 3.886 0.061
Married with non-dependent children 0.191 0.114 5.395 0.117 0.181 -0.055 1.718 0.052
Cohabitating with no children 0.046 -0.446 12.372 0.071 0.060 -0.241 5.314 0.044
Cohabitating with children 0.031 0.272 8.263 0.135 0.025 0.335 6.706 0.075
Lone parent 0.055 0.132 4.655 0.119 0.101 0.302 8.033 0.073
Moved in the last year 0.112 0.225 13.516 0.129 0.120 0.313 13.939 0.074
Black-Caribbean 0.009 0.439 9.859 0.155 0.012 0.042 0.733 0.057
Black-African 0.003 0.836 11.337 0.215 0.003 0.681 8.198 0.103
Black-Other 0.002 0.469 5.262 0.159 0.003 0.385 3.986 0.079
Indian 0.015 0.606 13.683 0.179 0.014 0.806 14.599 0.115
Pakistani or Bangladeshi 0.009 1.124 24.194 0.267 0.004 1.421 18.924 0.194
Chinese 0.002 0.157 1.528 0.122 0.003 0.070 0.513 0.059
Other Asian 0.003 0.440 5.167 0.156 0.004 0.544 5.381 0.091
Other ethnic group 0.004 0.489 7.121 0.162 0.004 0.451 4.829 0.084
Irish 0.011 0.174 3.458 0.124 0.012 -0.140 1.939 0.048
Pseudo R2 0.152 0. 20
Log likelihood -132271.98 -70940.942
Sample size 437,521 317,144
Notes: 1. The /-statistics are heteroscedastic adjusted as described by Huber (1967) and White (1980).
2. Residents of communal establishments were excluded from the logits because they contain no 
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Unemployment Logit Decompositions between UK Born and Foreign Born Residents
Whites Non-Whites
Males Females Males Females
Differences in Means
V  - i z 0.002 -0.016 0.092 0.063
x1 162.318 166.095 81.364 46.190’
Differences in Coefficients 
[P(otr,X*) -  P ( ^ ,X Z)] -0.009 -0.015 0.000 -0.008
Differences in Characteristics 
[P(dr,X>) -  P (a \X z)\ 0.011 -0.001 0.092 0.071





























































































We have used a derived variable provided by the SARs to describe ethnicity. Some more 
detail about its derivation is given below.
1 White: In addition Irish, Greek (inc. Greek Cypriot, Turkish (inc. Turkish Cypriot), 
Other European, Mixed White.
2 Black-Caribbean: In addition Caribbean Island, West Indian or Guyana.
3 Black-African: In addition Other African Countries.





9 Other-Asian (non-mixed): East African Indians, Indo-Caribbean, Indian subcontinent, 
Other Asian.
10 Other-Other: North African, Arab or Iranian, Asian/White (mixed), other British, other 
answers (non-mixed), Black/White mixed and other mixed (Other-Other).
11 Non-White: This is the sum of groups 1-10.
12 Whites bom in UK: Bom in England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and rest of 
UK.
13 Whites bom abroad: This includes the large immigrant group from Ireland.
14 Non-Whites bom in UK.





























































































With s and r fixed, the effect of an increase in the retaliation coefficient, workers’ 
productivity, and unemployment benefit on the value Dc can be found from totally 
differentiating eq.(9) to give
d q -d F
]
d U B - 1 
r + s + ^ °  <t>(p)dD r+s-
[ o D ' 0 ( o ) d D  l^r+s)UB+
°  d q -  ™  ~  
^ j ^ D  <t>(D)dD r + s  +  J
\° \q -D -F )< t> (p )d D ^




r+s+j°'<t>(D)dD + J + J
2
By using eq.(9) it can be seen that the 5th and 7th terms in eq.(16) cancel out, allowing us 
to sign the comparative statics as follows
dDc _ dDc _ -(r+s) 
dF dUB r+s+\ 





The effect on equilibrium unemployment can be seen by noting that a fall in Df lowers X. 
Equilibrium unemployment is defined as a point where outflows equal inflows, which is
\X  = sE, ( 18)
where X are the numbers unemployed and E are the numbers employed. Since E = L - X, 
where L is the labour force, then the equilibrium unemployment rate is
u = — , ( 19)
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